Latest news with #North Africa
Zawya
2 days ago
- Business
- Zawya
Egypt outlines roadmap to advance green transition via CBMA policy
Arab Finance: The Egyptian government rolled out plans to develop a roadmap for implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) policy to advance its green transition, according to a statement. Deputy Prime Minister for Industrial Development and Minister of Industry and Transport Kamel El-Wazir and Minister of Planning and Economic Development, and International Cooperation Rania Al-Mashat discussed joint efforts to support transition to low-emission industries. This goal will be achieved through financing and technical programs in cooperation with international development partners. The two sides reviewed the latest developments in implementing the Green Sustainable Industries (GSI) program, which provides various financing options, including soft loans and non-refundable grants, to rehabilitate Egyptian factories. They also touched upon the ongoing cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to launch the "NWFE" platform, which represents a strategic tool for attracting green investments in several sectors, most notably the industrial sector. The meeting also discussed a proposal to establish a new national platform similar to the NWFE program, aimed at mobilizing soft financing and international grants to support green industrial transformation projects within the private sector's manufacturing industries. Additionally, the two ministers explored opportunities available in Egypt to benefit from the High-Impact Private Sector Program, one of the flagship programs of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and managed by the EBRD. This initiative aims to support private sector projects in developing countries to cut industrial emissions and accelerate the transition to a green economy through a financing package that includes grants, soft loans, and innovative investment tools. El-Wazir and Al-Mashat highlighted the importance of this program, which aligns with the National Climate Change Strategy 2050 and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), noting that it does not impose any direct financial burdens on the state budget. On his part, El-Wazir directed the formation of a joint technical committee to monitor the implementation of key projects and ensure integration between government initiatives and international financing platforms to achieve results. Meanwhile, Al-Mashat outlined the results of international partnerships in the field of industrial development with various multilateral and bilateral development partners. She stressed that the non-petroleum manufacturing sector witnessed increasing development since the implementation of economic reform measures in March 2024. She indicated that the sector has been leading economic growth rates since the fourth quarter (Q4) of fiscal year (FY) 2023/2024 and throughout the first nine months of FY 2024/2025. It achieved a growth of 7.1% in Q1, followed by 17.7% in Q2, and 16.3% in Q3. Non-petroleum manufacturing industries contributed the most to growth rates in Q3 of FY2024/2025 at 1.9%, according to Al-Mashat. Through the GSI Program, development partners provided €271 million (EGP 16 billion), including approximately EGP 1.2 billion in grants. The remaining portion in soft financing for the private sector through Egyptian banks will be directed to reduce pollution in the industrial sector, encourage the use of renewable energy, and develop sustainable industrial practices. © 2020-2023 Arab Finance For Information Technology. All Rights Reserved. Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. (
Zawya
5 days ago
- Business
- Zawya
Egypt, World Bank explore deeper cooperation, partnership opportunities
Egypt's Minister of Public Enterprises Sector, Mohamed El-Shimy, met with a high-level delegation from the World Bank Group at the ministry's headquarters in the New Administrative Capital. The delegation included Stéphane Guimbert, World Bank Country Director for Egypt, Yemen, and Djibouti; Cheikh Oumar Seydi, Regional Director for North Africa at the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and Saad Sabra, IFC Country Officer in Egypt. The discussions focused on opportunities to deepen cooperation and strengthen the partnership between the Ministry of Public Enterprises and the World Bank Group, particularly in the areas of institutional development and attracting investment into state-owned enterprises, aligning with Egypt's broader strategy for inclusive and sustainable development. At the outset, Minister El-Shimy outlined the ministry's comprehensive strategy for reforming its affiliated companies, aimed at enhancing performance and ensuring long-term sustainability. This strategy is guided by three key frameworks: Egypt's Vision 2030, the government's action programme, and the State Ownership Policy Document. He emphasised that the ministry's vision seeks to maximise returns on state investments and increase the contribution of affiliated companies to national GDP, while enhancing their competitiveness both domestically and internationally. This is being pursued by modernising management practices, improving operational performance, optimising asset utilisation, and adhering to quality, governance, and sustainability standards. Attracting and encouraging private sector investment—both local and foreign—remains a central pillar of the ministry's strategy, El-Shimy added. He highlighted the ministry's openness to cooperation and partnerships across a range of sectors, noting the availability of numerous promising investment opportunities in industrial and service activities under its supervision. Several successful partnership models with both local and international private sector players already exist, he noted. El-Shimy also pointed to efforts to strengthen governance, transparency, and disclosure within affiliated companies, alongside a commitment to environmental sustainability and moving towards a green economy. This is reflected in various projects that comply with international environmental standards. Effective asset management and maximising returns remain key objectives of the ministry's reform agenda, he stressed. Investing in human capital is another top priority, El-Shimy noted, with the ministry implementing specialised training programmes to enhance employee skills and efficiency. He also highlighted the rollout of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems across several affiliated companies as part of the drive for digital transformation and improved governance. For their part, the World Bank Group delegation praised the ministry's reform strategy, its engagement with the private sector, and its commitment to institutional development and sustainable growth. They reaffirmed the World Bank Group's readiness to support the ministry and its affiliated companies through technical expertise and investment cooperation. © 2024 Daily News Egypt. Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. (
Zawya
11-07-2025
- Business
- Zawya
Tunisia's trade deficit widens to $3.4bln in the first half of 2025
Tunisia's trade deficit widened by 24% in the first half of 2025, reaching $3.4 billion, official data showed on Friday, underscoring persistent economic pressures on the North African country. The state Institute of Statistics said that the increase was driven by a rise in imports which reached $14.36 billion, particularly of energy that rose by 13%, while exports remained stagnant. ($1 = 2.8964 Tunisian dinars) (Reporting by Tarek Amara Editing by Tomasz Janowski)
Russia Today
11-07-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
As Tripoli burns, the West shrugs – and rivals quietly move in
In recent months, tensions have escalated in Tripoli, the capital of Libya, as political factions and armed groups clashed after a relatively long period of calm. The bloody clashes on the streets of Tripoli clearly show that the country, which has been engulfed in power struggles and turmoil for over decade, is a long way off from achieving unity, stability, and the rule of law despite the UN's efforts to facilitate elections, draft a constitution, and reorganize state structures. Chaos broke out on the night of May 13, when fighting erupted between various factions linked to the government of western Libya. The conflict was triggered by the assassination of the leader of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), Abdelghani al-Kikli, known as 'Ghneiwa.' Back in 2022, al-Kikli backed the head of the Government of National Unity (GNU), Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, during armed confrontations with the forces of Fathi Bashagha who was appointed prime minister by Libya's eastern-based parliament and attempted to take control over Tripoli. Presumably, Dbeibah's supporters killed al-Kikli at the Tekbali base, the headquarters of the 444th Combat Brigade affiliated with the GNU. Al-Kikli was there for a meeting with other commanders from western Libya. While the details surrounding his death are unknown, reports suggest he was shot at close range in the back of the head. Al-Kikli was a militia commander in Tripoli, who wielded significant influence over various governmental structures and was affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council – the country's highest executive authority which carries out the functions of the head of state. Following the outbreak of the civil war in 2014, he adeptly integrated his militia into the security apparatus of the government. The General Electricity Company was under al-Kikli's indirect control and was headed by his protégé Muhammad Al-Mashai. This company operates under the firm grip of armed factions that thwart any attempts to hold a state audit of its operations. Additionally, al-Kikli gained control over the Facilities Security Authority, the only organization authorized to oversee the secure transfer of funds between major banks in Tripoli and the Central Bank of Libya. In the capital, al-Kikli established an extensive business network spanning commerce, logistics, and retail, and recently sought to extend his influence into the strategically vital oil sector. His group is based in Tripoli's Abu Salim neighborhood, which came under the control of forces linked to the GNU's Ministry of Defense after heavy fighting on May 13. The operation utilized heavy armored vehicles, and Prime Minister Dbeibah hailed it as 'a significant achievement in ensuring security and restoring state authority in the capital,' emphasizing the commitment to unify security forces under one command. 'We will spare no one who continues to engage in corruption or extortion. Our goal is to create a Libya free from militias and corruption,' he said during a televised address. The clashes that followed al-Kikli's assassination lasted two days, engulfing residential areas in Tripoli. According to the UN, these confrontations were some of the fiercest Tripoli had seen in recent years. Fighting erupted between the 444th Brigade, led by Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads the GNU military intelligence, and the SSA. Another major armed group, the Deterrence Anti-Organized Crime and Terrorism Apparatus (RADA), led by Abdelraouf Kara, intervened after the 444th Brigade attacked areas under its control. On May 14, a ceasefire was agreed upon, and on May 18, the Presidential Council, acting as the Supreme Commander of the Libyan Armed Forces in collaboration with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), established a special truce committee. Shortly thereafter, mass protests erupted in the capital, calling for Dbeibah's resignation. At the same time, demonstrations in Misrata – Dbeibah's hometown – expressed support for him. To suppress the protests in Tripoli, armed groups were deployed and fired live ammunition. As a result, there were civilian casualties. Several GNU ministers resigned in solidarity with the demonstrators. In the midst of the Eid al-Adha celebrations, clashes reignited in Tripoli between rival factions, though they were quickly quelled by the efforts of the Reconciliation Committee. Simultaneously, fighting erupted in the city of Sabratha in western Libya. While currently the situation in the capital is relatively calm, the threat of renewed violence remains high. Despite the assassination of its leader, the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) continues to operate. Dbeibah lacks the authority to disband or restructure the SSA, which was established by a decree of the Presidential Council in 2021. Nevertheless, forces loyal to Dbeibah have seized control of several SSA facilities, including the group's base in Abu Salim. Subsequent video reports revealed ten charred bodies on the premises, while an additional 67 unidentified bodies were discovered in hospital morgues in the vicinity. Reports also surfaced about a burial site at the Tripoli zoo, which had been under SSA control. In light of this, the UN expressed serious concerns regarding security in Tripoli. Dbeibah has also failed to dissolve RADA, another group formed by the Presidential Council's decree. The head of the council, Mohammed Menfi, issued an order freezing any decisions made by the prime minister regarding the restructuring of security forces or appointments to military or law enforcement positions. By early June, the politicians reached an agreement, establishing a temporary security and military arrangements committee for Tripoli, headed by Menfi. This committee includes representatives from the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, RADA, and the Western Coast Military Zone. The recent hostilities stem from a struggle for influence and control over resources, but they also reflect a broader political divide in the country with two opposing centers of power – one based in Tripoli (western Libya) and represented by the Government of National Unity (GNU) and its affiliated armed groups and quasi-governmental forces, and the other based in Benghazi (eastern Libya), and led by the Libyan National Army (LNA) under Khalifa Haftar. This situation is the result of a protracted crisis that began in 2011 when opposition forces, with direct support from an international coalition primarily comprised of NATO countries, overthrew and killed Libya's longtime leader Muammar Gaddafi, who had ruled the country since 1979. This sparked a protracted war between various factions. In May 2014, then-Major General Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Dignity from Benghazi, targeting Islamist groups, including cells of the Islamic State. Haftar took control over Tripoli, where elections for the House of Representatives (HoR) took place. However, by August 2014, Haftar's forces were repelled from the capital, leading to the final bifurcation of power into two parallel structures: the House of Representatives, which relocated to Tobruk in the east, and the General National Congress (GNC), later replaced by the current High Council of State (HCS), established by Islamist groups. Each region established its own cabinet of ministers. In 2015, negotiations were held in Skhirat, Morocco, under the auspices of the UN; as a result, the parties agreed to sign a ceasefire agreement and establish a Government of National Unity (GNU). However, implementing the Skhirat Agreement proved challenging. Not all parties recognized its legitimacy and soon the hostilities in Libya reignited. Between 2019 and 2020, Khalifa Haftar, backed by Russia, Egypt, the UAE, and several other nations, launched another campaign to seize Tripoli, which also ended in failure. It was not until October 2020 that a permanent ceasefire was agreed upon in Geneva, again facilitated by the UN. Then, on February 5, 2021, during the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, representatives reached a consensus to create a temporary Government of National Unity, appointing Dbeibah as its head. At that time, Muhammad Menfi was also chosen to lead the Presidential Council established by the 2015 Skhirat Agreement. The new authorities were tasked with preparing the country for presidential and parliamentary elections within a year. However, the elections scheduled for December 24, 2021, were postponed indefinitely due to the inability of the House of Representatives in Tobruk and the High Council of State to agree on a legal framework for national voting. Since then, no electoral campaigns have been initiated, despite numerous dialogues between various factions from the east and west of the country. In September 2021, the House of Representatives in Tobruk expressed a vote of no confidence in Dbeibeh's cabinet, whose mandate had expired after the canceled elections. However, Dbeibeh showed no intention of leaving his post and declared that he would step down only after national elections were held. Subsequently, the Parliament appointed a new government in eastern Libya led by Fathi Bashagha, who unsuccessfully attempted to relocate his cabinet to Tripoli in 2022. Clashes erupted between the supporters of the GNU and those of Bashagha, forcing the latter to back down. The deep political divide that emerged in Libya following the ousting of Gaddafi has impacted nearly all state institutions. Currently, Libya has two rival governments. The first – Dbeibah's GNU – is based in Tripoli in the west of the country and is recognized by the UN, but not by Libya's parliament. The second, located in Benghazi in the east and headed by Osama Hammad, who replaced Bashagha, is backed by the parliament and Khalifa Haftar. This division extends beyond the executive and legislative branches; it has also affected the National Oil Corporation (NOC), which remained split between the east and west for years; it reunited only after the establishment of the GNU. Talks held in 2021 in Geneva also resolved the division of the Central Bank. However, key institutions such as the Libyan Audit Bureau and the Administrative Control Authority remain divided, and have offices both in Tripoli and Benghazi. For over a decade, various factions in both eastern and western Libya have pursued their own agendas, relying heavily on external support. The country has effectively split into two political entities – a military-oriented regime in the east and constantly warring armed groups and tribal factions in the west. In 2014, General Haftar, a former officer in Gaddafi's army, launched a campaign to rebuild the military under the banner of the Libyan National Army. With backing from the House of Representatives, he was officially appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 and was soon elevated to the rank of marshal by Speaker Aguila Saleh. What began as a force of just over 300 fighters has now grown to more than 120,000 soldiers and officers. A parade in Benghazi on May 26, 2025, demonstrated not only the army's personnel, but also its impressive arsenal of advanced weaponry. 'The army will have the final say at the critical moment,' said Haftar, sending a clear message to his opponents in western Libya. In light of the general chaos and the armed conflict in Tripoli, Haftar's statement carries particular weight, especially coming from Benghazi, a city that has enjoyed relative stability for many years. The eastern region remains the center of Haftar's political and military influence. His forces have effectively extended control to the southern territories, stretching from Benghazi through Sirte (where the frontline lies) and Jufra in the center of the country, reaching all the way to Libya's southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. Haftar also maintains influence over the so-called 'oil crescent' along the northeastern coast, home to key oil export terminals like Ras Lanuf, Es Sider, Brega, and Zueitina. It is likely that his forces control several important oil fields in southern Libya, which bolsters his economic and strategic influence. His dominance over most oil-rich regions is supported by a network of ground and air military bases scattered throughout eastern, central, and southern Libya. The most notable of these is the Al Jufra Airbase in central Libya, approximately 600 kilometers southeast of Tripoli, which was used as a launching pad for air operations during the war in Tripoli in 2019. Although Usama Hamada's government is not recognized internationally, it operates under Haftar's protection and aims to strengthen ties with cities in the east and south through projects initiated by the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund headed by Haftar's son, Belgasem. As for the House of Representatives, despite the expiration of what the UN considers its 'legitimate' term, it continues to enact laws and collaborates with the High Council of State in Tripoli on laying the groundwork for future elections. In Tripoli, the Presidential Council, led by Menfi, heads the executive branch following the 2020 Geneva Agreement. But although it is recognized by the international community, it lacks real power in Libya. While, symbolically, the Presidential Council is the supreme commander of the Libyan army, it has no actual control over it. In western Libya, it competes for authority with the Government of National Unity (GNU), which assumes executive and security functions. Dbeibah remains the key decision-maker regarding budgetary allocations across all sectors and institutions in Libya, even as the House of Representatives and the Central Bank demand to put an end to all funding except for salaries. Dbeibah remains the Minister of Defense but lacks a unified regular army and primarily relies on loyal armed groups, along with support from Türkiye which supplies him with Bayraktar TB2 drones and establishes military bases and training centers based on agreements made with the previous government. Forces in western Libya have several military bases, including the Al-Watiya Air Base located southwest of Tripoli and the Mitiga Air Base in the capital itself, and maintain shaky control over areas bordering Tunisia, Algeria, and parts of Niger. Libyans, especially those living in the country's western regions, have grown accustomed to living under the threat of renewed conflict and armed clashes, a reality starkly illustrated by recent events in Tripoli. Despite appearances of stability, the country has remained deeply divided since 2011. International efforts to resolve the situation in Libya have consistently failed, leading to a growing dissatisfaction with the existing UN structures among the populace. The prolonged absence of consensus suggests that many may be content with the status quo, and are unwilling to change anything. Even if the opposing factions view the current divide as a form of 'consensus,' the strong, influential Libya that existed under Muammar Gaddafi is long gone, and there are no immediate prospects for improvement.
Russia Today
10-07-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
When disorder means power: A bloody story of one oil giant
In recent months, tensions have escalated in Tripoli, the capital of Libya, as political factions and armed groups clashed after a relatively long period of calm. The bloody clashes on the streets of Tripoli clearly show that the country, which has been engulfed in power struggles and turmoil for over decade, is a long way off from achieving unity, stability, and the rule of law despite the UN's efforts to facilitate elections, draft a constitution, and reorganize state structures. Chaos broke out on the night of May 13, when fighting erupted between various factions linked to the government of western Libya. The conflict was triggered by the assassination of the leader of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), Abdelghani al-Kikli, known as 'Ghneiwa.' Back in 2022, al-Kikli backed the head of the Government of National Unity (GNU), Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, during armed confrontations with the forces of Fathi Bashagha who was appointed prime minister by Libya's eastern-based parliament and attempted to take control over Tripoli. Presumably, Dbeibah's supporters killed al-Kikli at the Tekbali base, the headquarters of the 444th Combat Brigade affiliated with the GNU. Al-Kikli was there for a meeting with other commanders from western Libya. While the details surrounding his death are unknown, reports suggest he was shot at close range in the back of the head. Al-Kikli was a militia commander in Tripoli, who wielded significant influence over various governmental structures and was affiliated with the Libyan Presidential Council – the country's highest executive authority which carries out the functions of the head of state. Following the outbreak of the civil war in 2014, he adeptly integrated his militia into the security apparatus of the government. The General Electricity Company was under al-Kikli's indirect control and was headed by his protégé Muhammad Al-Mashai. This company operates under the firm grip of armed factions that thwart any attempts to hold a state audit of its operations. Additionally, al-Kikli gained control over the Facilities Security Authority, the only organization authorized to oversee the secure transfer of funds between major banks in Tripoli and the Central Bank of Libya. In the capital, al-Kikli established an extensive business network spanning commerce, logistics, and retail, and recently sought to extend his influence into the strategically vital oil sector. His group is based in Tripoli's Abu Salim neighborhood, which came under the control of forces linked to the GNU's Ministry of Defense after heavy fighting on May 13. The operation utilized heavy armored vehicles, and Prime Minister Dbeibah hailed it as 'a significant achievement in ensuring security and restoring state authority in the capital,' emphasizing the commitment to unify security forces under one command. 'We will spare no one who continues to engage in corruption or extortion. Our goal is to create a Libya free from militias and corruption,' he said during a televised address. The clashes that followed al-Kikli's assassination lasted two days, engulfing residential areas in Tripoli. According to the UN, these confrontations were some of the fiercest Tripoli had seen in recent years. Fighting erupted between the 444th Brigade, led by Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads the GNU military intelligence, and the SSA. Another major armed group, the Deterrence Anti-Organized Crime and Terrorism Apparatus (RADA), led by Abdelraouf Kara, intervened after the 444th Brigade attacked areas under its control. On May 14, a ceasefire was agreed upon, and on May 18, the Presidential Council, acting as the Supreme Commander of the Libyan Armed Forces in collaboration with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), established a special truce committee. Shortly thereafter, mass protests erupted in the capital, calling for Dbeibah's resignation. At the same time, demonstrations in Misrata – Dbeibah's hometown – expressed support for him. To suppress the protests in Tripoli, armed groups were deployed and fired live ammunition. As a result, there were civilian casualties. Several GNU ministers resigned in solidarity with the demonstrators. In the midst of the Eid al-Adha celebrations, clashes reignited in Tripoli between rival factions, though they were quickly quelled by the efforts of the Reconciliation Committee. Simultaneously, fighting erupted in the city of Sabratha in western Libya. While currently the situation in the capital is relatively calm, the threat of renewed violence remains high. Despite the assassination of its leader, the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) continues to operate. Dbeibah lacks the authority to disband or restructure the SSA, which was established by a decree of the Presidential Council in 2021. Nevertheless, forces loyal to Dbeibah have seized control of several SSA facilities, including the group's base in Abu Salim. Subsequent video reports revealed ten charred bodies on the premises, while an additional 67 unidentified bodies were discovered in hospital morgues in the vicinity. Reports also surfaced about a burial site at the Tripoli zoo, which had been under SSA control. In light of this, the UN expressed serious concerns regarding security in Tripoli. Dbeibah has also failed to dissolve RADA, another group formed by the Presidential Council's decree. The head of the council, Mohammed Menfi, issued an order freezing any decisions made by the prime minister regarding the restructuring of security forces or appointments to military or law enforcement positions. By early June, the politicians reached an agreement, establishing a temporary security and military arrangements committee for Tripoli, headed by Menfi. This committee includes representatives from the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, RADA, and the Western Coast Military Zone. The recent hostilities stem from a struggle for influence and control over resources, but they also reflect a broader political divide in the country with two opposing centers of power – one based in Tripoli (western Libya) and represented by the Government of National Unity (GNU) and its affiliated armed groups and quasi-governmental forces, and the other based in Benghazi (eastern Libya), and led by the Libyan National Army (LNA) under Khalifa Haftar. This situation is the result of a protracted crisis that began in 2011 when opposition forces, with direct support from an international coalition primarily comprised of NATO countries, overthrew and killed Libya's longtime leader Muammar Gaddafi, who had ruled the country since 1979. This sparked a protracted war between various factions. In May 2014, then-Major General Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Dignity from Benghazi, targeting Islamist groups, including cells of the Islamic State. Haftar took control over Tripoli, where elections for the House of Representatives (HoR) took place. However, by August 2014, Haftar's forces were repelled from the capital, leading to the final bifurcation of power into two parallel structures: the House of Representatives, which relocated to Tobruk in the east, and the General National Congress (GNC), later replaced by the current High Council of State (HCS), established by Islamist groups. Each region established its own cabinet of ministers. In 2015, negotiations were held in Skhirat, Morocco, under the auspices of the UN; as a result, the parties agreed to sign a ceasefire agreement and establish a Government of National Unity (GNU). However, implementing the Skhirat Agreement proved challenging. Not all parties recognized its legitimacy and soon the hostilities in Libya reignited. Between 2019 and 2020, Khalifa Haftar, backed by Russia, Egypt, the UAE, and several other nations, launched another campaign to seize Tripoli, which also ended in failure. It was not until October 2020 that a permanent ceasefire was agreed upon in Geneva, again facilitated by the UN. Then, on February 5, 2021, during the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, representatives reached a consensus to create a temporary Government of National Unity, appointing Dbeibah as its head. At that time, Muhammad Menfi was also chosen to lead the Presidential Council established by the 2015 Skhirat Agreement. The new authorities were tasked with preparing the country for presidential and parliamentary elections within a year. However, the elections scheduled for December 24, 2021, were postponed indefinitely due to the inability of the House of Representatives in Tobruk and the High Council of State to agree on a legal framework for national voting. Since then, no electoral campaigns have been initiated, despite numerous dialogues between various factions from the east and west of the country. In September 2021, the House of Representatives in Tobruk expressed a vote of no confidence in Dbeibeh's cabinet, whose mandate had expired after the canceled elections. However, Dbeibeh showed no intention of leaving his post and declared that he would step down only after national elections were held. Subsequently, the Parliament appointed a new government in eastern Libya led by Fathi Bashagha, who unsuccessfully attempted to relocate his cabinet to Tripoli in 2022. Clashes erupted between the supporters of the GNU and those of Bashagha, forcing the latter to back down. The deep political divide that emerged in Libya following the ousting of Gaddafi has impacted nearly all state institutions. Currently, Libya has two rival governments. The first – Dbeibah's GNU – is based in Tripoli in the west of the country and is recognized by the UN, but not by Libya's parliament. The second, located in Benghazi in the east and headed by Osama Hammad, who replaced Bashagha, is backed by the parliament and Khalifa Haftar. This division extends beyond the executive and legislative branches; it has also affected the National Oil Corporation (NOC), which remained split between the east and west for years; it reunited only after the establishment of the GNU. Talks held in 2021 in Geneva also resolved the division of the Central Bank. However, key institutions such as the Libyan Audit Bureau and the Administrative Control Authority remain divided, and have offices both in Tripoli and Benghazi. For over a decade, various factions in both eastern and western Libya have pursued their own agendas, relying heavily on external support. The country has effectively split into two political entities – a military-oriented regime in the east and constantly warring armed groups and tribal factions in the west. In 2014, General Haftar, a former officer in Gaddafi's army, launched a campaign to rebuild the military under the banner of the Libyan National Army. With backing from the House of Representatives, he was officially appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 and was soon elevated to the rank of marshal by Speaker Aguila Saleh. What began as a force of just over 300 fighters has now grown to more than 120,000 soldiers and officers. A parade in Benghazi on May 26, 2025, demonstrated not only the army's personnel, but also its impressive arsenal of advanced weaponry. 'The army will have the final say at the critical moment,' said Haftar, sending a clear message to his opponents in western Libya. In light of the general chaos and the armed conflict in Tripoli, Haftar's statement carries particular weight, especially coming from Benghazi, a city that has enjoyed relative stability for many years. The eastern region remains the center of Haftar's political and military influence. His forces have effectively extended control to the southern territories, stretching from Benghazi through Sirte (where the frontline lies) and Jufra in the center of the country, reaching all the way to Libya's southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. Haftar also maintains influence over the so-called 'oil crescent' along the northeastern coast, home to key oil export terminals like Ras Lanuf, Es Sider, Brega, and Zueitina. It is likely that his forces control several important oil fields in southern Libya, which bolsters his economic and strategic influence. His dominance over most oil-rich regions is supported by a network of ground and air military bases scattered throughout eastern, central, and southern Libya. The most notable of these is the Al Jufra Airbase in central Libya, approximately 600 kilometers southeast of Tripoli, which was used as a launching pad for air operations during the war in Tripoli in 2019. Although Usama Hamada's government is not recognized internationally, it operates under Haftar's protection and aims to strengthen ties with cities in the east and south through projects initiated by the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund headed by Haftar's son, Belgasem. As for the House of Representatives, despite the expiration of what the UN considers its 'legitimate' term, it continues to enact laws and collaborates with the High Council of State in Tripoli on laying the groundwork for future elections. In Tripoli, the Presidential Council, led by Menfi, heads the executive branch following the 2020 Geneva Agreement. But although it is recognized by the international community, it lacks real power in Libya. While, symbolically, the Presidential Council is the supreme commander of the Libyan army, it has no actual control over it. In western Libya, it competes for authority with the Government of National Unity (GNU), which assumes executive and security functions. Dbeibah remains the key decision-maker regarding budgetary allocations across all sectors and institutions in Libya, even as the House of Representatives and the Central Bank demand to put an end to all funding except for salaries. Dbeibah remains the Minister of Defense but lacks a unified regular army and primarily relies on loyal armed groups, along with support from Türkiye which supplies him with Bayraktar TB2 drones and establishes military bases and training centers based on agreements made with the previous government. Forces in western Libya have several military bases, including the Al-Watiya Air Base located southwest of Tripoli and the Mitiga Air Base in the capital itself, and maintain shaky control over areas bordering Tunisia, Algeria, and parts of Niger. Libyans, especially those living in the country's western regions, have grown accustomed to living under the threat of renewed conflict and armed clashes, a reality starkly illustrated by recent events in Tripoli. Despite appearances of stability, the country has remained deeply divided since 2011. International efforts to resolve the situation in Libya have consistently failed, leading to a growing dissatisfaction with the existing UN structures among the populace. The prolonged absence of consensus suggests that many may be content with the status quo, and are unwilling to change anything. Even if the opposing factions view the current divide as a form of 'consensus,' the strong, influential Libya that existed under Muammar Gaddafi is long gone, and there are no immediate prospects for improvement.
